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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, firms have increasingly committed themselves to global markets. This 
has coincided with a surge of activities by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that have expanded 
abroad through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), transferring some level of their Intangible Assets 
(IAs) to local subsidiaries.   
IAs may consist either in a stock of goodwill, which is associated with product quality reputation, 
or in superior knowledge, which is related, for instance, to an idea, a good customer relationship, a 
new tool, or superior management techniques.  
Compared to physical capital, intangible resources are more likely to give rise to FDI because they 
can be easily transferred back and forth and they are of “public good” nature, being available to 
additional production facilities at relatively low costs (Markusen, 1995). Notice that the very joint-
ness  feature  that  enables  MNEs  to  move  IAs  at  a  low  cost  also  exposes  them  to  the  risk  of 
dissipation
1.  
While abstracting from any reputation consideration, this paper is intended to explore the exact role 
that dissipation of knowledge plays in orienting multinational activity, with a particular attention to 
the boundaries of the MNE. 
Across  the  wide  array  of  feasible  contracts  in  a  foreign  country,  we  focus  specifically  on  the 
comparison between wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) and joint-venture (JV), to assess the relative 
attractiveness of full versus shared ownership of the production affiliate. 
On the one hand, international JVs offer the possibility to make profitable use of the local partner 
capabilities; they may facilitate cooperation with foreign governments, and generate knowledge that 
could be valuable in future business operations (Desai et al., 2002). These advantages, however, are 
often offset by the implicit costs of split ownership: proximity to Intangible Assets may enable the 
local  company  to  expropriate  the  MNE’s  key  resource  and  start  a  rival  firm.  On  the  contrary, 
wholly-owned  subsidiaries  secure  knowledge  within  the  firm’s  boundaries,  but  typically  bring 
higher costs, because an integrated firm is less efficient than a pair of specialized producers, and 
lacks expertise and familiarity with the local market.   3 
Although  the  role  of  IAs  in  assessing  the  WOS/JV  trade  off  has  been  broadly  investigated  in 
empirical  terms  (see,  among  others:  Anderson  and  Gatignon,  1986;  Gomes  Casseres,  1989; 
Hennart,  1991;  Agarwal  and  Ramaswami,  1992;  Erramilli,  1996;  Buckley  and  Casson,  1996; 
Smarzynska, 2000; Desai et al., 2002; Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002; Herrmann and Datta, 2002; 
Brouthers, 2002; Guillen, 2003; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998a, 1998b; Sanna Randaccio, 1993), it 
remains surprisingly unexplored in its theoretical aspects; indeed, to the best of our knowledge, all 
the theoretical formalisations based on Intangible Assets
2 (see, for instance: Ethier and Markusen, 
1996; Markusen, 2001; Saggi, 1996, 1999; Fosfuri, 2000; Mattoo et al., 2001; Fosfuri et al., 2001; 
Glass and Saggi, 2002)  compare Foreign Direct Investment and licensing, but they ignore the case 
of shared ownership, which is typical of a joint-venture agreement. 
This paper is intended to fill the gap between the theory and the data, and possibly reconcile the two 
strands mentioned above.  
First, we provide a new firm-level dataset, on the whole population of Italian firms with wholly-
owned subsidiaries or joint-ventures in Asia. Data come from an extensive survey, conducted by the 
author,  to  derive  detailed  information  on  MNEs’  Intangible  Assets,  such  as  human  capital  and 
technology, adding to traditional economic variables. According to the respondents’ answers, the 
main reason for operating in a WOS is the wish to preserve IAs, while joint-venture establishments 
ground on the attempt at finding a complementary partner, well acquainted with the local market 
and efficient in input supply.  
As  a  second  step,  we  build  on  this  evidence  to  explore  the  trade  off  between  full  and  shared 
ownership more rigorously, both in theoretical and empirical terms. On the one hand, we extend the 
Dissipation of Intangible Assets (DIA) framework to incorporate joint-venture contracts; in a two-
period, two-country framework, as in studies by (Etheir and Markusen, 1996; Saggi, 1999; Mattoo 
et  al.,  2001),  we  show  that  full  ownership  is  more  likely  to  emerge  the  higher  the  threat  of 
Intangible Assets dissipation, an idea resembling the theoretical findings on the FDI/licensing trade 
off. On the other hand, we exploit our dataset to test these predictions: probit estimates confirm that 
Italian  firms  endowed  with  better  technology  and  human  capital  are  more  prone  to  internalise   4 
production  activities,  rather  than  establishing  joint-ventures  in  Asia,  in  line  with  the  empirical 
literature mentioned before. 
The present paper relates to several strands.  
Our focus on human capital and technology brings the analysis close to the studies on knowledge 
transfer  costs  (see  Caves,  1974;  Teece,  1977,  1986;  Davidson  and  Mc  Fetridge,  1984; 
Ramachandran,  1993;  Glass  and  Saggi,  1999).  However  we  depart  from  this  literature  in  two 
aspects: we take the MNE’s point of view, and consider knowledge dissipation as a negative aspect, 
not as a source of growth; moreover, technology transfer is not the ultimate focus of our research, 
but  rather  one  of  the  factors  that  may  influence  the  entry  mode  decision  of  Multinational 
Enterprises. 
The  great  importance  of  Intangible  Assets  and  their  influence  on  the  most  appropriate 
organisational form is also at the heart of a relatively recent strand in the Theory of the Firm, 
according to which power stems from access to critical resources, rather than ownership of physical 
assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2000, 2001). While adopting a similar perspective on the role of 
IAs in driving the international organisational decision, we are more interested in the WOS-JV trade 
off, than in the choice between horizontal and vertical hierarchies. 
As far as the theoretical part of the paper is concerned, our model is close to the literature on the 
boundaries of the multinational firm based on the risk of Dissipation of Intangible Assets (Ethier 
and  Markusen,  1996;  Markusen,  2001;  Saggi,  1996,  1999;  Fosfuri,  2000;  Mattoo  et  al.,  2001; 
Fosfuri  et  al.,  2001;  Glass  and  Saggi,  2002).  However,  instead  of  sticking  to  the  standard 
WOS/licensing  trade  off,  we  formalize  the  WOS/joint-venture  choice  in  terms  of  knowledge 
spillover. 
Finally, the empirical part of the paper can be ascribed to those econometric studies (see, among 
others:  Anderson  and  Gatignon,  1986;  Gomes  Casseres,  1989;  Hennart,  1991;  Agarwal  and 
Ramaswami, 1992; Erramilli, 1996; Buckley and Casson, 1996; Smarzynska, 2000; Desai et al., 
2002; Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002; Herrmann and Datta, 2002; Brouthers, 2002; Guillen, 2003; 
Mutinelli  and  Piscitello,  1998a,  1998b;  Sanna  Randaccio,  1993)  that  regress  the  choice  of  full   5 
versus  shared  ownership  on  firm,  industry,  and  country  characteristics  in  discrete  dependent 
variable-models. Indeed, we adopt a similar methodology, making large use of micro data, and find 
consistent results on the role of DIA: whenever intangible resources are included in econometric 
specifications,  they  positively  affect  the  choice  of  full  ownership,  in  line  with  our  model’s 
implications and the empirical evidence reported here. Despite these analogies, the present paper is 
intended to make a few steps further. The first one relates to the theoretical background. Most of the 
papers mentioned above are purely empirical: either they ignore any theoretical insight on the topic, 
treating IAs like control regressors, rather than core ones or they qualitatively extend some formally 
derived DIA argument about licensing agreements to the case of joint-ventures. In both cases there 
is no convincing prior over the sign of Intangible Assets in shaping the WOS/JV trade off: either 
such a prior is dictated by common sense, more than rigorous formalisations, or it comes from 
models  in  which  joint-venture  contracts  are  not  explicitly  considered.  Our  empirical  exercise 
grounds instead on the model’s predictions, therefore it is intended to provide a more direct link 
between the theory and the data. The second step we make refers to the definition of knowledge, as 
a key asset likely to orient multinational activity. Although knowledge, in theory, should embrace 
both human capital and technological aspects, it is usually proxied only by technological measures 
such as patents and R&D expenditure due to the lack of firm-level information. Taking advantage 
of an extremely detailed dataset, we offer here a more complete characterization of knowledge by 
adding  human  capital  variables  in  the  form  of  employees’  skills  to  the  broadly  documented 
technological ones. Estimates show that Italian firms endowed with superior technology and better 
human capital rely more on full ownership when expanding abroad. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the simple theoretical model; 
Section 3 is entirely devoted to the empirical analysis – data description (3.1), methodology (3.2) 
and Probit estimates (3.3); Section 4 concludes and sets the future agenda. 
 
2. The model   6 
In a partial equilibrium framework as in (Etheir and Markusen, 1996; Saggi, 1999; Mattoo et al., 
2001), consider a two-country - North (N) and South (S) - two-period -1 and 2 - model in which a 
multinational firm, located in the North, is willing to produce a final good in the South. To add 
concreteness to the model, we could think of the North as Italy, of the South as the Asian market, as 
in the empirical part of the paper. The S market is populated by a single firm, which acts as a 
monopolist, and sells the same good as the MNE in N. The Multinational Enterprise has to decide 
whether to produce in the foreign market within the boundaries of a wholly-owned subsidiary or in 
joint-venture with the local firm, and it cannot change supply mode between the first and the second 
period
3. 
By assumption, final good production requires two activities - which we call input manufacturing 
and final good processing - according to a linear technology that employs 1 unit of input to obtain 1 
unit of output. 
Notice that these steps can be performed either by the multinational (through its subsidiary) or by 
the local enterprise, but the two firms are not equally efficient; based on the experience of Italian 
firms in Asia, we allow the MNE to have an advantage in processing final goods due to its superior 
knowledge and the other party to do better in input manufacturing due to its familiarity with the 
local context. Indeed empirical evidence shows that Italian multinationals tend to contribute know-
how and technology while relying on their Asian partner for input supply. 
To capture this idea without loss of generality, we assume that the cost per unit of each activity is 
zero, if it is performed by the company that has a relative advantage in it, and c (c>0) otherwise. 
As in (Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Saggi, 1999; Markusen, 2001; Mattoo et al., 2001) demand is 
linear in the S market; in particular: 
Q a p - =                                                                                                                                        (1)  
where p is the price, Q denotes the total quantity, Q = qMNE + qlocal and the parameter a>0 captures 
market size
4; MNE and local stand for the multinational and the local firm respectively. 
As in Fosfuri (2000), firms attach equal weight to every period, i.e. the discount factor is equal to 1.   7 
Through full ownership of the production affiliate, the Multinational Enterprise keeps all production 
activities within the boundaries of a wholly-owned subsidiary; in this case it is the same firm that 
performs both input manufacturing and final good processing, competing in quantities with the local 
company. Therefore, the Southern market becomes a symmetric Cournot duopoly, with marginal 
(and average) cost equal to c.  
The essence of a joint-venture agreement lays, instead, in the partners’ complementary skills
5: in 
this case, each party performs only the activity in which it has a relative advantage, and sales 
revenues are shared with weights θ (0<θ<1) for the MNE and (1- θ) for the local firm, in the first 
period, and q (0<q <1), (1- q ) in the second period. If a JV contract is signed, market S becomes a 
monopoly,  and  final  good  production  rests  with  the  joint-venture.  Although  Multinational 
Enterprises are free to choose their preferred mode of entry into all the countries considered in our 
empirical analysis, we are aware that some Asian governments still impose restrictions to foreign 
ownership under the joint-venture contract
6. Put another way, MNEs can freely decide to establish a 
wholly-owned subsidiary or to engage in a partnership with a local firm but, in the second case, the 
host government is likely to fix an upper bound θ for the foreign share. Under these circumstances, 
it is clear that the multinational firm sets its first period share equal to θ to retain the highest 
possible part of the joint-venture revenue, provided that the participation constraint of the local 
partner is satisfied, which is always the case in our model. In the second periodq ≤ θ is chosen by 
the MNE to avoid Intangible Assets dissipation, as clarified below.  
Consider, first, the case of full ownership. After solving the symmetric Cournot game, Equation (2) 
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By operating on its own the Multinational Enterprise benefits from keeping entire revenues in both 
periods, but it entails higher costs in input manufacturing, compared to the local company.   8 
On the contrary, production efficiency is achieved, under a JV agreement, but none of the two 
parties can appropriate total monopoly revenues, which are, instead, shared. In this case, firms’ 
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The key point of the model is that the joint-venture allows for a potential spillover mechanism 
between the two firms.  
Consider first the possibility of a one-way spillover, running from the MNE to the local firm: 
having access to the multinational Intangible Assets – human capital and technology - the partner 
might learn about the processing procedure so that her cost disadvantage c drops to a lower level sc 
in  the  second  period,  with  0<s<1
7.  According  to  our  modelling,  s  measures  the  extent  of  the 
spillover effect, lower values being associated with higher degrees of knowledge dissipation.  
In this case, while the local firm has the option of breaking up the JV contract, and start a rival firm 
with the “stolen” know-how, the multinational stops servicing the Southern market if defection 
takes place. Although this is clearly a strong theoretical assumption (it will be removed later on), it 
provides a good starting point for the analysis and it can be justified in empirical terms. Indeed, 
one-way spillovers seem to be the most frequent type of situation for Italian firms in Asia. Based on 
our data, while MNEs fear to dissipate their crucial resources under joint-venture agreements, they 
do not rely much on the possibility to learn from a local partner. This probably has to do with the 
intrinsic nature of Italian FDI in Asia which covers mostly manufacturing activities and the way JV 
partners share production, with the local company providing inputs due to its familiarity with the 
local market, and the multinational processing components due to its superior technology. While 
market knowledge and linkages cannot be quickly appropriated – especially in countries such as 
China and India – technology is easily exposed to the risk of dispersion
8. 












                                                                                                             (5)                                         
while the multinational, having no other option, earns zero. 
It is clear that the MNE can prevent defection by setting q such that the local firm’s second period 
profit,  under  JV,  is  not  lower  than  its  profit  in  starting  a  rival  firm;  this  is  the  Incentive 
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In the end, under the assumption of a one-way spillover, the multinational chooses to integrate, 
rather than partnering if 
WOS
MNE P  from (2) is greater than  
JV
MNE P  from (3), evaluated at the incentive 
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q                                                                                                   (7)                                                                                    
Equation (7) gives the condition for the MNE to produce within the boundaries of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, instead of signing a joint-venture agreement. It is solved for s in Result 1: 
Result 1 (See Appendix A for details) 
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, the MNE always chooses full ownership;  







, both arrangements may emerge, depending on the extent of 
the spillover effect: for lower values of s (i.e. strong spillover effect), the MNE prefers full 
ownership to avoid knowledge dissipation; for higher values of s (i.e. weak spillover effect)  JV 
emerges as an equilibrium outcome; 
iii) if θ>G(a,c), the MNE always chooses joint-venture;   10 




MNE P - P , increases as long as 
s decreases (i.e. stronger spillover effect). 
Based on our formalisation, in choosing between full and shared ownership, MNEs trade off the 
benefit of retaining total revenues and protecting IAs, with the cost of efficiency losses in terms of 
input manufacturing. 
From Result 1, it is clear that the JV option is never appealing if the upper bound, imposed by the 
local government, is lower than a threshold F(a,c): in this case, the benefit of production efficiency 
is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing to the MNE. The risk of 
dissipating knowledge plays no role under these circumstances, because full ownership is per se 
attractive compared to a partnership in which the foreign firm has just a small stake. 
Opposite to this is the situation in which θ is greater than a threshold G(a,c) since the MNE’s large 
share in the partnership makes the joint-venture absolutely appealing from the point of view of the  
Multinational Enterprise, despite the spillover mechanism that benefits the local partner. 
The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation comes at play only for intermediate values of the first 
period share: when F(a,c)<θ<G(a,c), θ is not large or small enough to drive the MNE’s entry mode 
decision per se; here we see that WOS prevails for lower values of s (i.e. higher cost reduction for 
the local firm, induced by knowledge dissipation), while JV emerges, as an equilibrium outcome, 
for higher values of s (here the spillover effect is so mild that it is completely outweighed by 
production efficiency considerations).  
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to this case, because it is the most 
relevant for Italian companies
9. 
Consider now the possibility of a two-way spillover that allows both firms to learn from each other: 
this  reflects  the  recent  view  that  Multinational  Enterprises  not  only  transfer  but  also  absorb 
technology from the host country (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002, 2004; Singh, 2007).   11 
The only difference with respect to the basic version of the model is that firms benefit from an equal 
cost  reduction  through  spillover,  therefore  the  Southern  market  becomes  a  symmetric  Cournot 
duopoly (with marginal cost sc) in case of defection. 





















                                                                                                                   (5b) 
Equations (2), (3) and (4) still refer to the multinational profits under full ownership, and the two 
parties’ gains under a JV agreement
10. 
In principle, we could think that the possibility of a two-way spillover widens firms’ contractual 
arrangements, making MNEs choose among three candidate solutions: wholly-owned subsidiary, 
joint-venture in both periods and joint-venture in the first period only. Notice, however, that the 
basic trade off for the Multinational Enterprise is still between full and partial ownership. 
Indeed, before comparing the multinational profits from (2), (3) and (5a) we need to substitute 
forq . How is  q set by the MNE in case of a two-way spillover? It still satisfies the local party 
Incentive  Compatibility  Constraint,  but  such  a  constraint  crucially  depends  on  the  MNE’s 
preference towards joint-venture or defection. This is the key difference with respect to the basic 
version of the model: if the spillover runs only one-way, the MNE surely wants to prevent defection 
to avoid zero profit in the second period; if the spillover runs two-ways, the MNE wants to prevent 
defection only when  JV
MNE
d
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³ q                                                                                                                                   (9)   12 
Condition  (9)  thus  discriminates  between  the  multinational’s  preference  for  JV  or  defection: 
depending on (9) holding or not the MNE behaves differently, selecting  q  in such a way as to 
prevent or to induce defection by the local partner. Therefore, the multinational never has the three 
contractual arrangements to choose from at the same time but, conditional on (9), it compares WOS 
versus JV in both periods or WOS versus JV in the first period only. 
Suppose  that  (9)  holds:  in  this  case  the  MNE  makes  higher  profits  under  joint-venture  than 
defection,  therefore  it  setsq to  prevent  defection,  according  to  the  Incentive  Compatibility 












- £ q                                                                                                                             (6’)                                                                                            
The relevant comparison is between WOS and joint-venture in both periods and the multinational 
integrates, rather than partnering if 
WOS
MNE P  from (2) is greater than  
JV
MNE P  from (3), evaluated at the 
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q                                                                                               (7’)                   
Compare (7) with (7’): the left hand side is the same, while the right hand side of (7’) is larger. This 
means  that,  ceteris  paribus,  full  ownership  becomes  less  attractive  when  the  MNE  has  the 
possibility to learn from the local partner. However, results on the role of DIA still hold, since s 
enters (7) and (7’) the same way. 
Now suppose that (9) does not hold: in this case the MNE makes higher profits under defection than 
joint-venture, therefore it setsq to induce defection, violating the Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
of  the  local  party  (6’).  Therefore,  it  selects  the  highest  possible  value  for  the  second  period 
share, 1 ® q , but this is not compatible with (9) not holding, which we assumed before. As a result, 
defection  never  takes  place,  as  in  the  case  of  a  one-way  spillover:  to  induce  an  opportunistic 
behaviour by the local partner, the MNE needs to retain a very high share of the partnership, but in 
doing this it prefers to preserve the JV contract in both periods, rather than breaking it. Given the 
logical contradiction, there is no equilibrium in which the local party starts a rival firm with the   13 
stolen know-how. So, we can stick to Result 1 for the main conclusions about the role of DIA in 
designing the boundaries of the multinational enterprise. 
In particular, according to Result 1, the profit gap for the MNE between full and shared ownership 
is  decreasing  in  s,  which  is  in  line  with  the  empirical  evidence  from  Mansfield  et  al.  (1979), 
Mansfield and Romeo (1980), Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Gomes Casseres (1989), Hennart 
(1991), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) Erramilli (1996), Buckley and Casson (1996), Smarzynska 
(2000), Desai et al. (2002), to mention just a few. This means that the relative profitability of the 
integrated solution is very high when the risk of spillover is high as well, because avoiding DIA is 
far more important than being efficient in production; as long as the threat of dissipation decreases, 
the  attractiveness  of  full  ownership  decreases  as  well  since  firms,  having  nothing  valuable  to 
protect, earn more by being efficient. 
Therefore,  based  on  Result  1,  we  expect  to  see  wholly-owned  subsidiaries  in  circumstances  in 
which know-how easily spills over, corresponding to lower values of the parameter s in the model
11. 
This gives precious empirical hints at firm and industry level.  
At firm level, if we look at the entire population of Italian investors, those endowed with superior 
knowledge and better human capital are expected to select full ownership of the production affiliate 
as their preferred mode of entry. This is because firms of this sort have something valuable to 
protect: given that R&D investment to achieve a high technology level is costly, firms are reluctant 
to freely share the fruit of their research with a potentially lower skilled partner. The same is true 
for human capital: skilled employees become such because of the education and regular training 
that enable them to develop ideas and use sophisticated management techniques. Skilled employees 
are thus a precious resource but also an extremely costly input from the enterprises’s point of view: 
to attract talents, it needs to pay high wages, and to update its personnel’s knowledge, it has to 
organize training courses, which are costly as well. It is clear that the more a company invests in 
human capital, the less prone it is to operate abroad in a partnership, being exposed to the risk of 
dissipating its crucial assets through learning or demonstration effect within the boundaries of a 
joint-venture.
12   14 
At sector level, our expectation is that investors belonging to high tech industries have a stronger 
preference towards full ownership, relative to investors from traditional ones, where firms invest 
little in R&D and patent less. 
Although  our  simple  theoretical  exercise  was  motivated  by  the  wish  to  explore  the  correlation 
between Intangible Assets and multinational activity, given our modelling it is possible to push the 
analysis a bit farther and discuss to what extent the cost disadvantage c and the market size a affect 
the trade off between full and shared ownership and derive some testable predictions, adding to the 
role of DIA. 
Equation (7) is solved for c in Result 2. 
Result 2 (See Appendix A for details) 
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2)      i)  In  the  relevant  parameter  space  for  empirical  purposes  (i.e.  F(a,c)<θ<G(a,c))  both 
arrangements may emerge, depending on the extent of the cost disadvantage: for lower values 
of  c  (i.e.  weak  cost  disadvantage)  the  MNE  prefers  full  ownership,  because  production 
inefficiency is not very pronounced; for higher values of c (i.e. strong cost disadvantage) JV 
emerges as an equilibrium outcome to cut production costs; 




MNE P - P , decreases as long 
as c increases (i.e. stronger cost disadvantage). 
Based on Result 2, we expect to observe a stronger preference towards shared ownership when the 
cost of operating abroad is prohibitively high for the Multinational Enterprise, so that it needs a 
local partner well acquainted with the host country, and efficient in input supply. The lack of firm-
level  information  about  costs  makes  us  infer  that  country-level  indicators  -  such  as  economic 
freedom and openness – could be reasonable proxies for c, measuring the difficulty of operating in 
the Southern market. The more transparent and dynamic the host country, the easier it is to operate 
there for the MNE and the more likely the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries.   15 
As far as market size is concerned, empirical evidence is mixed: in (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998b; 
Buckley  and  Casson,  1999)  huge  host  countries  are  better  approached  through  wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, while Smarzynska (2000) documents an opposite pattern. Equation (7) is solved for a 
in Result 3 to derive some testable predictions about the impact of market size on firms’ ownership 
decision. 
Result 3 (See Appendix A for details) 
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2)  i)  In  the  relevant  parameter  space  for  empirical  purposes  (i.e.  F(a,c)<θ<G(a,c))  both 
arrangements may emerge, depending on market size: for low and high values of market size 
the MNE prefers full ownership, while for intermediate values JV emerges as an equilibrium 
outcome; 
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c a , then it increases. 
Based  on  Result  3,  wholly-owned  subsidiaries  prevail  for  low  and  high  values  of  market  size, 
reconciling  the  mixed  empirical  evidence  mentioned  above.  On  the  one  hand,  if  the  Southern 
market is small, the multinational prefers full ownership to keep its entire revenues, rather than 
sharing the little cake it has with a local partner. On the other hand, if the host country is large, 
wholly owned-subsidiaries are still preferable for appropriating all benefits: in this case, defection 
by a local partner would be too costly for the MNE to risk knowledge spillover within a joint-
venture.  
At  this  stage,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  profit  gap  between  full  and  shared  ownership  is 
decreasing in a up to a thresholda ˆ , then it is increasing. This gives precious empirical hints at the 
country level. If we look at the entire set of destination economies, the probability of full ownership   16 
is expected to go down with an increase in market size: larger countries are better accessed with a 
local partner than alone as long as a<a ˆ . The key point is that the threshold depends on c, θ, s: huge 
host economies like the Chinese or the Indian ones, included in our sample, can be below  a ˆ simply 
because  the  cost  disadvantage  of  operating  there  is  extremely  high  or  because  the  profit  share 
accruing to the MNE is large. While the influence of Intangible Assets on the relative attractiveness 
of full ownership was clear cut, the impact of market size seems to be more subtle, and the ultimate 
answer will come from the data. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this Section, we test the main findings derived above and empirically assess the choice of full 
versus shared ownership of the production affiliate made by Italian multinationals in Asia. For the 
purpose of the present work, a new firm-level dataset is employed. The discussion is organised in 
three steps: first we present the data (3.1) and the specification (3.2), and then we comment the 
econometric estimates (3.3) and their matching with the theoretical priors from Section 2. 
3.1 Data 
The  empirical  analysis,  conducted  by  the  author  between  2001  and  2005,  builds  on  a  survey 
questionnaire,  exploring  the  international  choices  of  more  than  300  Italian  manufacturing 
companies with production affiliates in Asia which consists of China, India and the South East 
Asian (SEA) countries - Malaysia,  Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Philippines, South 
Korea and Japan.  
Although relatively small, we believe that this sample is highly representative of the Italian case, 
since it accounts for around 90% of all Italian investors in the region of interest
13. 
The  questionnaire,  based  on  multiple  choice  responses,  consists  of  two  sections:  first  we  ask 
background information to derive a general profile of the parent company; then we investigate the 
choice of full versus shared ownership and the major challenges faced in the destination country, for   17 
a total of more than 40 questions overall. Additional balance sheet or industry-level data are derived 
from AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende) and ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica). 
The experiences of Italian MNEs in Asia are very diverse. An initial look at the survey results 
suggests that it is impossible to draw a single “Italian” profile, because investors differ in many 
regards. 
If we look at the number of employees, we find that medium (45%) and large (29%) companies 
account  for  the  largest  presence  in  Asia,  followed  by  small  (25%)  and  handcraft  (6%)  ones
14; 
according to sales, 44% of the firms top 50 million Euros, 16% is between 25 and 50 million Euros 
and 22% below 10 million. 
Figure 1 displays the sectoral distribution of the parent companies: based on the Bell and Pavitt 
(1993)
15  classification,  Italian  MNEs  belong  to  “supplier  dominated”  sectors  the  most  (37%), 
followed  by  the  “specialised  supplier  dominated”  (36%),  “science  based”  (14%)  and  “scale 
intensive” (13%) ones. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
Interviews reveal that firms pay large attention to the human capital of their employees: many of 
them  require  English  (70%)  and  computer  (94%)  skills  from  everybody,  around  40%  organise 
periodic training courses that last longer than 6 months and the percentage of employees holding a 
degree is higher than 25% in 43% of the cases. 
Experience in managing international operations seems high as well: many respondents have been 
engaged in licensing activities (9%), import/export (49%), franchising (4%), WOS (20%) and joint-
venture (18%) in more than 5 countries (80%) and for longer than 10 years (77%) before the present 
involvement in Asia. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of Italian affiliates: China is the largest recipient - accounting for 
56% of WOS and JV establishments in the whole region - followed by India (17%), Malaysia (9%) 
and Thailand (6%), while Japan occupies the last position. 
[insert Figure 2 about here]   18 
Notice  that  manufacturing  activities  in  Asia  are  driven  by  various  purposes,  depending  on  the 
destination. In particular, market access considerations play a major role in large countries like 
China, India and Indonesia but also in small ones like Thailand, Singapore and South Korea which 
serve as a commercial platform for the entire Asian region (see Figure 3). At the same time, the low 
cost  of  labour  provides  an  important  motive  for  de-locating  production  in  some  developing 
countries like Vietnam, China, India and the Philippines.  
In addition, it is worth mentioning that 45% of the goods produced in Asia are intended to satisfy 
the local demand, while 55% are exported abroad. Evidence shows that the wish to become more 
competitive, a good chance, the existence of trade barriers elsewhere or special incentives to foreign 
activity consist of further reasons to open subsidiaries. 
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
As far as the WOS/JV trade off is concerned, joint-venture establishments (57%) prove to be the 
most common mode of entry for Italian companies in Asia. Nonetheless, full ownership of the 
production affiliate has been extensively preferred to shared ownership in many countries, such as 
Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, suggesting that there 
might be some country-specific effects at play in the real world (see Figure 4). 
[insert Figure 4 about here] 
According to the survey responses, the reasons to engage in a partnership rather than operating in 
wholly-owned  subsidiaries,  range  from  gaining  local  support  (54%)  to  risks  and  costs  sharing 
(20%),  from  achieving  the  optimal  size  (10%)  to  skills  (7%)  and  competitive  position  (2%) 
enhancing or law restrictions (8%)
16 (see Figure 5). This gives a preliminary confirmation to the 
role of complementary skills stressed in the model, with the Asian firm contributing cheap labour 
force and deep knowledge of the local market and the MNE providing know-how and managerial 
techniques. 
[insert Figure 5 about here] 
Among the 43% of respondents that operate in a WOS, a large majority (83%) choose this mode in 
order to achieve strong control over technology transfer and high flexibility standards, in line with   19 
our theoretical predictions: especially high tech companies are very reluctant to invest in developing 
countries  since  they  do  not  want  to  share  their  know-how  with  a  lower  skilled  partner.  Full 
ownership of the production affiliate seems the most natural way to avoid this risk, as MNEs simply 
work alone and they do not consult with a local counterpart on management decisions. For about 
21% of the sample, the wholly-owned subsidiary represents an evolution from a former JV, while 
6% choose to operate alone due to the lack of an appropriate local partner, as reported in Figure 6. 
[insert Figure 6 about here] 
3.2 Specification 
Based on the data briefly reviewed in 3.1, we regress the choice of full versus shared ownership of 
the production affiliate made by Italian multinationals in Asia, within the DIA framework sketched 
in Section 2.  
Our unit of analysis is the production affiliate. The econometric specification is as follows: 
e s d a
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WOS is the (n x 1) dependent variable vector, whose elements take value 1 in case of wholly-owned 
subsidiary, 0 in case of joint-venture.  
To capture the higher degree of complexity of the real world, compared to our stylized theoretical 
framework, explanatory variables are of three types: F is a (nxm) matrix of Firm-level regressors; I 
is  a  (nxl)  matrix  containing  Industry-level  indicators  and  C  is  a  (nxk)  matrix  of  host  Country 
characteristics; α, δ and σ are the vectors of parameters associated to firm, industry and country 
variables respectively, and ε denotes the error term. 
Notice that, within F, we distinguish between core and control regressors: core variables are those 
measuring Italian firms’ Intangible Assets, over which priors have already been derived; control 
variables denote other firm-level characteristics that may play a role in shaping the Internalisation 
decision. 
Recall from our previous discussion (Sections 1 and 2) that knowledge covers both human capital 
and technological aspects, so our core firm-level regressors refer to both types. This is an important   20 
novelty, compared to the previous empirical literature: although human capital is often mentioned 
as  a  key  asset  that  is  likely  to  orient  multinational  activity,  it  has  rarely  been  included  in 
econometric tests, due to the lack of firm-level information. A few exceptions are (Mutinelli and 
Piscitello, 1998a, 1998b; Sanna Randaccio, 1993) where human capital is measured at industry 
level, by the ratio of skilled workers over total workers in the sector of the local unit. 
As  a  proxy  for  technology,  we  employ  alternative  indicators,  such  as  the  value  of  patents 
(PATENT); the ratio of patents over sales (PATENT/SALES); and, similarly to (Blomstrom et al., 
1989;  Smarzyinska,  2000),  whether  or  not  the  parent  firm  belongs  to  a  high  tech  sector 
(HIGHTECH), with a particular focus on the TELECOM one. To capture the role of technological 
leadership,  the  variable  TECH_relative  is  also  included:  it  measures  the  overall  technological 
endowment of the parent company – as the sum of R&D and advertising expenditure - relative to 
the industry mean (Desai et al., 2002; Smarzyinska, 2000).  As far as human capital aspects are 
concerned,  two  measures  are  adopted:  the  extent  of  the  training  courses  that  the  parent  firm 
periodically organises for its employees (TRAINING), and their level of education (GRADUATE). 
All these variables refer to the consistency of the parent company’s Intangible Assets, so we overall 
expect a positive sign, based on Result 1: according to the model, full ownership induced by the 
threat of knowledge dissipation (captured by parameter s) is more likely to emerge when know-how 
easily spills over – i.e. when firms are endowed with more technology and human capital or they 
belong to high tech industries
17. Moreover, our indicators of IAs are characterized by a low degree 
of correlation, meaning that they represent different dimensions of the firms’ key resources (see 
table b3 in Appendix B). 
Firm-level control variables include: sales (SALES, as in Blomstrom and Zejan, 1991; Meyer 1998; 
Smarzynska 2000); the destination of the goods produced in Asia (H_purpose)  which allows us to 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical purposes; the importance of firm-level scale economies 
(SCALE); a proxy for the MNE’s experience in running foreign operations (COUNTRIES, similarly 
to  Herrmann  and  Datta,  2002;  Guillen,  2003;  Mutinelli  and  Piscitello,  1998a,  1998b;  Sanna   21 
Randaccio, 1993) and its location in Italy (NORTH-EAST). A few industry controls - METAL and 
PRECISION - are also added to econometric estimates. 
As for country variables, we consider: TRADE, as a measure of the host market degree of openness 
(the same measure is employed also in Smith, 2001; Arora at al., 2001; Smarzynska, 2000); a 
property  right  index  (PRI)  and  an  economic  freedom  index  (EFI),  to  capture  host  country 
restrictions to foreign ownership (similarly to Rapp and Rozek, 1990; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; 
Lee  and  Mansfield,  1996;  Smarzynska,  2000;  Mutinelli  and  Piscitello,  1998a,  1998b;  Sanna 
Randaccio, 1993). In the spirit of Result 2, TRADE, EFI, and PRI can be considered as a measure of 
the  cost  disadvantage  of  the  MNE  in  the  host market  (parameter  c  in  the  model).  Therefore  a 
positive sign is expected, meaning that full ownership prevails when operating abroad is relatively 
easy. In addition, the variable POP is also included; it is our proxy for market size (parameter a in 
the model) and a dummy (SEA), specifying whether the host country belongs to the South East 
Asian region. While the impact of knowledge spillover and cost disadvantage was clear-cut in the 
model, the sign of POP cannot be predicted ex ante, depending on the threshold a ˆ (see Result 3). 
Appendix  B  contains  more  information  about  the  variables  included  in  the  econometric 
specification,  and  provides  summary  statistics  of  the  continuous  regressors  and  the  correlation 
matrix of the proxies for Intangible Assets. 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable WOS, regressions are carried out within a Probit 
framework. 
3.3 Results 
Probit estimates are shown in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
While keeping into consideration the main theoretical priors from Result 2 it is worth noticing that 
all the core variables measuring Intangible Assets are significant with the expected sign and they 
remain so across different specifications. This provides a first important result and suggests quite a 
good matching between the theory and the data
18.   22 
In particular, moving from the simplest specifications on the left where WOS is regressed only on 
core-type variables to the richer specifications on the right where control variables are also included 
we see that with an increase in the Italian firms’ Intangible Assets, the probability of full ownership 
increases as well.  
Indeed,  HIGHTECH,  TELECOM,  PATENT,  TECH_relative,  PATENT/SALES,  GRADUATE  and 
TRAINING all display the expected positive sign; this means that wholly-owned subsidiaries are 
more likely to be set up by Italian companies that are technological leaders in their respective field, 
operating in high tech sectors, holding patents in Italy, and possessing well trained and cultured 
employees. These findings, in line with Result 1, are broadly consistent with the existing empirical 
literature (see, among others, Smarzynska, 2000; Desai et al., 2001; Brouthers, 2002; Chen and Hu, 
2002) and they add precious information about the role of human capital, as a key resource driving 
the WOS/JV choice of Italian companies in Asia. 
As far as control variables are concerned, METAL and PRECISION turn out to be significant, with a 
positive  sign,  meaning  that  parent  firms  engaged  with  production  of  metal  goods  or  precision 
instruments, watches and optical appliances have a higher probability of operating through wholly-
owned subsidiaries. SALES is significant, as well, with a negative sign (as in Blomstrom and Zejan, 
1991; Meyer, 1998)
19, suggesting that larger enterprises tend to share ownership with an Asian 
partner, rather than operating alone. This probably has to do with the bargaining power of the Italian 
investor: the larger the MNE, the stronger its position in negotiating favourable JV conditions. Not 
surprisingly, firm-level scale economies (SCALE) encourage full ownership, since the integrated 
solution helps to exploit the cost advantage of production on a larger scale. Estimates also show that 
investors  coming  from  NORTH-EAST  are  more  prone  to  operate  in  wholly-owned  subsidiaries, 
while  their  experience  in  running  foreign  operations  (COUNTRIES)  and  horizontal  purpose 
(H_purpose) lead them towards joint-venture establishment. Indeed, being used to manage foreign 
operations  might  help  to  protect  Intangible  Assets  more  effectively  and  to  avoid  the  risk  of 
knowledge dissipation. At the same time, it is clear that investors wishing to penetrate the local 
market  –  horizontal  purpose  -  are  more  likely  to  operate  in  joint-venture  in  order  to  to  take   23 
advantage of the partner knowledge of the host country
20, whereas investors aiming at producing in 
Asia but exporting final goods elsewhere – vertical purpose – do not need a local counterpart and 
better protect their assets through WOS. Notice also that intra-firm trade – which is associated with 
vertical FDI – implies that the subsidiary should be more tightly knit into the MNE network, thus 
requiring stronger control as compared to horizontal investment. 
According  to  our  data,  country  variables  also  play  a  role  in  driving  the  WOS/JV  trade  off,  as 
suggested by the survey answers. In particular, TRADE, EFI and PRI are significant with a positive 
sign, meaning that the higher the degree of openness and economic freedom and the lower the 
property right (PR) protection, the more appealing the integrated solution. These results are not 
surprising:  multinational  enterprises  clearly  prefer  to  operate  alone  if  PRs  are  not  adequately 
preserved, to avoid dissipation; full ownership is also favoured by an open and free environment, 
where  economic  conditions  are  transparent  and  so  there  is  no  need  for  local  support.  Similar 
evidence, in line with Result 2, can be found in (Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002; Smarzynska, 
2000)
21. Notice, also, that operations in South East Asian countries – captured by the dummy SEA – 
are more likely to be conducted via WOS than in joint-venture. 
In the end, we find that the size of the recipient country – measured by POP – is significant and 
negative, which implies that larger countries tent to be accessed through joint-ventures rather than 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. In the model’s words even huge host economies, like the Chinese or the 
Indian, still fall below the threshold  a ˆ  identified in Result 3. This probably depends on the high 
cost disadvantages of operating in those markets or the large profit shares accruing to the MNE.  
In certain aspects, the present paper complements previous empirical studies on Italian Foreign 
Direct  Investment  due  to  (Mutinelli  and  Piscitello,  1998a,  1998b;  Sanna  Randaccio,  1993). 
Compared to those studies, first we provide new data through survey interviews, second we build a 
theoretical model, as a ground for the estimates, and third we investigate the role of DIA, which has 
been previously neglected.  Indeed, in (Sanna Randaccio, 1993; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998a, 
1998b), the focus is more on knowledge sourcing, rather than knowledge dispersion, but we are   24 
quite  confident  that  the  risk  of  spillover  plays  a  major  role  in  orienting  multinational  activity, 
because this comes out in the extensive survey that motivates our theoretical and empirical exercise.  
Despite the different time span and sample, one striking similarity across all studies – including the 
present  one  -  is  the  clear  preference  of  Italian  firms  for  joint-venture  establishments.  Sanna 
Randaccio (1993) focuses on roughly 100 Italian MNEs engaged in manufacturing FDI worldwide 
in the period 1974-1986, Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b) analyse more than 300 Italian 
parent companies with joint-venture or wholly-owned subsidiaries abroad in 1986-1993, and this 
paper studies Italian FDI in Asia in the XXI century: irrespective of the period and the data, shared 
ownership turns out to be the most preferred contract selected by Italian investors. This probably 
has to do with financial and managerial constraints that limit mostly small and medium enterprises, 
making them act prudently to minimize risks through the partnership. Indeed, the large majority of 
Italian firms, being small in size, are likely to face constraints of those types, which push towards 
shared ownership ceteris paribus. 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that the estimates from Table 1 might potentially suffer 
from selection bias since our sample, although highly representative of the Italian case is just a 
fraction of the universe. Selection bias could originate from our focus on Italy, as the only home 
country, and Asia as the only recipient region in addition to the fact that we do not include in the 
analysis firms that did not invest abroad or firms that adopted entry modes different from WOS and 
JV. 
Data constraints make it extremely hard to overcome these problems in a rigorous way; however we 
believe that the estimates, shown in Table 1, provide quite a realistic approximation of the reality. 
First of all, notice that the geographic dimension of the selectivity issue vanishes when we compare 
these results with the already established empirical literature (see, for instance: Smarzynska, 2000; 
Desai et al., 2002; Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002): irrespective of the home and host country, the 
risk  of  dissipating  Intangible  Assets  is  highly  correlated  with  full  ownership  of  the  production 
affiliate.   25 
Second, wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint-ventures turn out to be the only alternatives chosen by 
Italian firms in Asia, so it was not a matter of choice to set the comparison between the two. 
Third, since the ultimate goal of this research is to provide a link between IAs and the relative 
attractiveness of full ownership, we interpret the econometric estimates more as a general indication 
of what is related to the choice of WOS than a precise comparison among the marginal effects of 
the regressors. In principal, we could allow for a previous step in which MNEs choose whether to 
go abroad before they select the entry mode; however such a step is deliberately ignored in the 
theoretical part of the paper to keep the formalisation as simple as possible, and to maintain a better 
match between the theory and the data. Moreover, based on interviews, we are quite confident that 
the extent of firms’ Intangible Assets is related to the choice of full versus shared ownership, rather 
than the decision to invest abroad because our database documents the experience of extremely 
varied companies, some of them being very high tech, others being completely traditional, but all 
operating in Asia. This is the reason why we believe that technology and human capital are more 
likely to orient the WOS/JV trade off than the location decision.  
Finally, notice that in presenting our estimates, we resist any generalizing attempt and consider 
them as a simple exercise to check whether the experience of Italian firms in Asia is consistent with 
the theoretical expectations derived in Section 2. It effectively summarizes the content of many 
interviews we conducted with the real actors at play. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Multinational Enterprises may penetrate into a foreign market through alternative channels from 
export  to  wholly-owned  subsidiaries,  from  joint-venture  to  licensing  each  of  them  involving  a 
different degree of Intangible Assets transfers from the parent to the local firms. 
This paper studies the relative attractiveness of WOS versus JV, namely the choice of full versus 
shared ownership of the production affiliate, in terms of DIA. 
Although  the  role  of  Intangible  Assets,  in  assessing  the  WOS/JV  trade  off,  has  been  broadly 
investigated in empirical terms (see, among others: Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gomes Casseres,   26 
1989; Hennart, 1991; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Erramilli, 1996; Buckley and Casson, 1996; 
Smarzynska, 2000; Desai et al., 2002; Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002; Herrmann and Datta, 2002; 
Brouthers, 2002; Guillen, 2003; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998a, 1998b; Sanna Randaccio, 1993), it 
remains substantially unexplored in its theoretical components, since authors (see, for instance: 
Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Markusen, 2001; Saggi, 1996, 1999; Fosfuri, 2000; Mattoo et al., 2001; 
Fosfuri  et  al.,  2001;  Glass  and  Saggi,  2002)    usually  compare  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and 
licensing, ignoring the case of shared ownership, which is typical of a joint-venture agreement. 
This paper is a first attempt at filling the gap between the theory and the data.  
For the purpose of the present research, we have been building a new firm-level dataset, on the 
whole  population  of  Italian  firms  with  FDIs  in  Asia.  According  to  the  survey,  wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are motivated by the wish to preserve knowledge, while joint-venture establishments 
ground on complementary skills.  
Building on this evidence, we explore the WOS/JV trade off more rigorously, both in theoretical 
and empirical terms. First of all, a simple extension of the DIA framework allows us to incorporate 
shared ownership as an alternative to the full one. By assumption, wholly-owned subsidiaries avoid 
knowledge dispersion, but involve efficiency losses; on the contrary, joint-ventures are efficiency 
enhancing, but firms retain only a share of total revenues and knowledge is subject to dissipation. In 
a two-period, two-country framework, we show that full ownership is more likely to emerge, the 
higher  the  threat  of  Intangible  Assets  dissipation,  resembling  the  theoretical  findings  on  the 
FDI/licensing trade off.  
Second,  these  findings  are  tested  with  the  data  on  Italian  operations  in  Asia;  probit  estimates 
confirm that wholly-owned subsidiary is preferred when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when 
firms are endowed with more human capital and technology, belong to high tech industries, or turn 
out to be technological leaders in their respective sector. Notice that our focus on human capital 
aspects, beyond the broadly documented technological ones, represents an important novelty with 
respect to the existing literature, since employees’ skills are rarely considered in empirical studies, 
due to the lack of firm-level data.   27 
Given our promising results, we think that it is worth carrying out further research within the DIA 
framework,  to  better  investigate  its  impact  on  multinational  activity.  Future  steps  include  the 
treatment of the whole array of feasible contractual arrangements - namely joint-venture, licensing, 
export and wholly-owned subsidiaries – in a single unitary model and the provision of further 












                                                 
Footnotes 
1 Dissipation, in this framework, entails a different meaning, depending on the asset under consideration:  in the case of 
knowledge, a spillover mechanism is likely to operate, allowing the local counterpart to appropriate production secrets, 
copy final goods and eventually start a rival firm on the basis of the “stolen” asset; in the case of reputation, dissipation 
comes because the local counterpart benefits form the MNE’s brand image, but puts no effort in maintaining and 
enhancing it. 
2 Building on Dunning (1993)’s OLI paradigm, theories of the boundaries of the Multinational Enterprise have fruitfully 
developed along three directions, called: Theories of the Firm, Agency Costs, Dissipation of Intangible Assets (See 
Markusen, 1995; Saggi, 2000; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Gattai (2006) for surveys). For the purpose of the 
present work, we focus solely on the DIA approach. Notice that this strand of the literature identifies FDI with wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Therefore, in our terminology, it compares the relative attractiveness of WOS and licensing, based   28 
                                                                                                                                                                  
on dissipation of intangible assets. The reason why we introduce the term WOS here is that joint-ventures and wholly-
owned subsidiaries are often regarded as different types of FDI, thus falling below the same category. 
3 This option is instead considered in Markusen (2001), where the MNE can choose a different licensee in the second 
period.  
4 Given this functional form, 0<c<a. 
5 Our modelling of the joint-venture contract is quite close to Ramachandran (1993), Mattoo et al. (2001), Glass and 
Saggi (2002). Notice that the WOS/joint-venture decision does not necessarily coincide with the Greenfield/Acquisition 
one. In particular joint-ventures differ from Acquisitions because the local firm is not “bought” by the MNE, and the 
two enterprises do not “merge” into a new economic entity: they simply make a temporary cooperation agreement in 
order to produce final goods together. This is the reason why the local partner may deviate in the second period and 
eventually start a rival firm, as it is explained below, in Section 2. 
6 For more details, see: www.ice.it, www.indmin.nic.in. 
7 Although licensing provides a more direct channel for technology transfer because the licensor has to provide the 
licensee with the whole set of production tools, working side by side in a joint-venture similarly allows the local firm to 
learn from the MNE. Notice, moreover, that s is strictly greater than zero, meaning that the cost reduction, induced by 
knowledge dissipation, cannot make the local firm exactly as efficient as the MNE in processing final goods. At the 
same time s is strictly lower than 1, meaning that a spillover mechanism – although very weak, if s→ 1 - is always at 
work in the joint-venture. 
8 In other DIA papers, the asymmetry between the multinational firm and the local licensee is captured by a fixed cost 
incurred by the MNE in operating alone in the local market (see, for instance: Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Saggi, 1996; 
Fosfuri, 2000; Fosfuri at al., 2001). 
9 Furthermore, many empirical studies identify the joint-venture as a contract in which the equity owned by the foreign 
investor is at least 10% and less than 95%, avoiding very low and very high shares (see, among others, Mutinelli and 
Piscitello, 1998a, 1998b; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Sanna Randaccio, 1993; Gomes Casseres, 1989). In our sample 
we do not have shares lower than 10% or higher than 95%.  
10 Recall that the general expression of firms’ profits, under the different contractual arrangements, depends on the 
market structure, namely monopoly in case of joint-venture, and symmetric Cournot duopoly under full ownership and 
defection. 
11 Notice that Result 1 is phrased in terms of the parameter θ in order to distinguish between the three cases - i (only 
WOS in the relevant parameter space 0<s<1) ii (WOS or JV in the relevant parameter space 0<s<1) iii (only JV in the 
relevant parameter space 0<s<1). As discussed above, for empirical purposes, we restrict attention to case ii. Therefore,   29 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for intermediate values of θ (case ii), Result 1 predicts how changes in s affect the relative attractiveness of full versus 
shared ownership. This is what we want to test in the empirical part of the paper, finding proxies for the risk of 
spillover. 
12 It is clear that technology and human capital do not spill over the same way because the former is non-rival, while the 
second is rival, residing with humans. Human capital potentially spills over through one of the following channels: i) 
the local company hires skilled personnel from the MNE; ii) learning or demonstrations take place within the joint-
venture; iii) human capital represents the stock of non-patented knowledge in the MNE. Based on empirical evidence 
(see Section 3), we interpret human capital spillover as in ii). 
13 The complete list of investors was obtained through intersection of all the available sources: ICE (Istituto Commercio 
Estero),  Reprint-Politecnico,  Italian  Embassies  and  Chambers  of  Commerce  in  Asia.  In  line  with  the  theoretical 
specification, attention was restricted to manufacturing firms with production activity.  
14 Based on ISTAT classification, large enterprises have more than 500 employees, medium enterprises have 100-499, 
small and handcraft ones have 11-99 or less than 10 respectively. 
15 Based on Bell and Pavitt (1993) firms can be grouped in four categories of technological development: in traditional 
“supplier dominated” industries – like textile, leather, shoes, furniture, potteries etc. – technical change comes from 
supplier of inputs, while technology is transferred in the form of capital goods and components; in “scale intensive” 
industries – like automobile and chemicals – technical change is generated by the design and operation of complex 
production systems; in “science based” high-tech industries, technology emerges from corporate R&D and it is heavily 
dependant on academic research; finally, “specialized supplier dominated” firms provide high performance equipment 
in the form of components, instruments or software to advance users. 
16 See www.ice.it and www.indmin.nic.in for more details about the restrictions to foreign property in the countries of 
interest. 
17 For the sake of completeness, we should mention that the role of technological leadership – captured by the variable 
TECH_relative – is not so clear-cut. On the one hand, investors enjoying a technological lead in their respective sectors 
are perceived as more attractive JV partners by local firms and governments; therefore, they are more able to negotiate 
more favourable terms of agreement. Moreover, the technological gap between foreign leaders and domestic producers 
may be so large that, even in case of knowledge transfer, the threat of IA dissipation is minimal. On the other hand, the 
technology gap may not be enough to prevent knowledge dissipation, so investors possessing technological advantage 
over other firms in their sector may potentially incur in greater losses from knowledge dissipation than investors with 
less sophisticated technologies. Therefore, the impact of TECH_relative might be positive or negative (Smarzynska 
2000).   30 
                                                                                                                                                                  
18 This evidence is  also consistent with an explanation à la Antras and Helpman (2004): since full ownership is a very 
costly mode of entry, the most productive firms in terms of human capital and technology get engaged in WOS, while 
the least productive ones prefer to operate via joint-venture.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
19 A different result is obtained in (Pan, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002), where sales are shown to be positively correlated 
with the probability of entering a foreign market alone. 
20 This is perfectly in line with the questionnaire responses reviewed in Section 2.1: gaining local support – in terms of 
interacting with local authorities, marketing final products etc. - has proved to be the main reason for Italian MNEs to 
undertake JV projects in Asia. 
21 The positive sign of TRADE and EFI can be interpreted also with regard to another common explanation of joint-
ventures, namely risk reduction. Risk reduction can take one of the following forms: a) similar resources are pooled 
together to spread the risk of a large project over more than one firm; b) the investor associates with a local partner to 
limit the political risks of the foreign operations (Sanna Randaccio, 1993). In this sense, the lack of openness to trade or 
economic freedom, making the Southern market more risky, might increase the probability of a JV. The importance of 
risk reduction is well documented in our interviews (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 3: Investors’ purpose is establishing their affiliates in Asia, by country 
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Table 1: Probit estimates 
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Marginal effects and P-value in round brackets displayed. * means significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. Pseudo R
2 is a typical measure for goodness of fit in discrete-dependent-
variable models. The expression for Pseudo R
2 is 1-1/[1+2(logL1-logL0)/N], where N is the total number 
of observations, L1 is the maximum log-likelyhood value of the model of interest, and L0 the maximum 
value of the log-likelyhood function when all the parameters, except the intercept, are set equal to 0. P-
value^ denotes the P-value of the joint null-hypothesis. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A contains the main derivations of Section 2.  
A1 Proof of Result 1 
1) Equation (7) is equivalent to: 
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MNE P > P  - for
1 s>s2 or s<s1.  
Since 0<s<1, we need to control whether s1 and s2 belong to the interval (0, 1), to draw conclusion 
on the prevalence of WOS versus JV in the model’s range for s. 
It is easy to show that s2>1, therefore it falls outside the model’s range for s and it is not mentioned 
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 and s1<0 if θ>G(a,c).  




MNE P > P  - for s<s1, and combine this result with 
those about s1. Recall also that 0<s<1, by assumption of the model. It follows that: 
                                                 
1 Notice that 
9
) ( 8 9 9
2 2 2 c a a a - - + q
is positive for 0<c<a and 0<θ<1, so
9
) ( 8 9 9
2 2 2 c a a a - - + q
exists and it is a real 
number. 
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i) If θ<F(a,c), then s1>1: (7) is always verified. This means that in the model’s range for s (0<s<1) 
full ownership of the production affiliate is always preferable to joint-venture because it provides 
the MNE with higher profits.   
ii) If F(a,c)<θ<G(a,c), then 0<s1<1: (7) is verified for 0<s<s1. This means that in the model’s 
range for s (0<s<1) full ownership prevails for low values of s, while joint-venture is chosen for 
high values of s. 




MNE P < P  for 0<s<1, and full 
ownership is never chosen.                                                      
iv) The profit gap, between WOS and JV, from the point of view of the MNE equals: 
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In the model’s range for c and s - 0<c<a and 0<s<1- (a5) is negative, namely a decrease in s (more 
cost reduction through knowledge spillover) increases the profit gap, for the MNE, between full and 
shared ownership of the production affiliate.                     
 
A2 Proof of Result 2 
1) Equation (7) is equivalent to: 
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MNE P > P  - for
2 c>c2 or c<c1.  
 Since 0<c<a, we need to control whether c1 and c2 belong to the interval (0, a), to draw conclusion 
on the prevalence of WOS versus JV in the model’s range for c. 
It is easy to show that c2>a, therefore it falls outside the model’s range for c and it is not mentioned 
in Result 2. On the contrary c1 is always smaller than a and 0<c1<a if
9
8
< q . 
2)  i)  The  relevant  parameter  space  for  empirical  purposes  is  the  one  in  which  Dissipation  of 
Intangible  Assets  matters  for  the  choice  between  full  and  shared  ownership,  i.e. 




< q . Therefore full ownership is preferred for 0<c<c1, while shared ownership emerges for 
c1<c<a. 
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In the model’s range for a, s and c – a>0, 0<c<a, 0<s<1 - the derivative is negative, namely an 
increase in c (more cost disadvantage for the MNE, relative to the local enterprise) decreases the 
profit gap between full and shared ownership of the production affiliate.                                     
 
 
A3 Proof of Result 3 
1) Equation (7) is equivalent to: 
0 9 8 ) 18 16 ( ) 9 8 (
2 2 2 2 > + + + - - c s c sc c a a q                                                                                  (a10)                                                                                   
Call: 
                                                 
2 Notice that 
2 2 9 8 16 s s s q q + + + is positive for 0<s<1 and 0<θ<1, so
2 2 9 8 16 s s s q q + + + exists  and it is a real 
number. 















72 81 144 9 9 8
2 2
1
s s s s















72 81 144 9 9 8
2 2
2
s s s s
c a                                                                                  (a12)                                                                                                          




MNE P > P  - for
3 a>a2 or a<a1.  
 Since a>0, we need to control whether a1 and a2 are positive, to draw conclusion on the prevalence 
of WOS versus JV in the model’s range for a. 
It is easy to show that a2>0 and a1>0 if 
9
8
< q . 
2)  i)  The  relevant  parameter  space  for  empirical  purposes  is  the  one  in  which  Dissipation  of 
Intangible  Assets  matters  for  the  choice  between  full  and  shared  ownership,  i.e. 
) , ( ) , ( c a G c a F < <q (see comments to Result 1 in Section 2). In this range it is easy to show that 
9
8
< q . Therefore full ownership is preferred for a<a1 or a>a2, while shared ownership emerges for 
intermediate values of market size. 
ii) The derivative of the MNE’s profit gap between full and shared ownership (a4) with respect to a 
is: 
18
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Given the model’s range for a, s and c – a>0, 0<c<a, 0<s<1 – in the relevant parameter space for 
the empirical analysis (
9
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c a a .  This means that the 
profit gap between full and shared ownership decreases as long as a increases up to  a ˆ  then it 
increases.                                
 
                                                 
3 Notice that  q q 72 81 144 9
2 2 + + + s s s is positive for 0<s<1 and 0<θ<1, so q q 72 81 144 9
2 2 + + + s s s exists and it is a 
real number. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B contains a description of the variables included in econometric specification (Table 
b1),  it  provides  summary  statistics  of  the  continuous  regressors  (Table  b2)  and  the  correlation 
matrix of the core-type ones (Table b3). 
Table b1: Variables description 
Variable  Description 
WOS 
Dummy variable, 1 if WOS, 0 if JV. 
Type: regressand. 
Source: interviews 
GRADUATE  Dummy variable, 1 if the percentage of employees with a degree, in the parent firm, is larger than 
25%, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews 
TRAINING  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm organizes training courses for the employees longer than 6 
months, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews 
HIGHTECH  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to a “high tech” sector, i.e. a sector in which the average 
R&D expenditure is more than 500,000 Euro. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica ) data.  
PATENT  Patents of the parent firm (millions Euro). 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. 
Source:  AIDA  (Analisi  Informatizzata  delle  Aziende,  it  is  a  dataset  that  comprises  balance  sheet 
information of more than 200,000 Italian companies with sales lager than 500,000 Euro)  
TECH_relative  Total value of the parent firm’s technology – R&D expenditure + advertising expenditure - over its 
industry mean. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm; in particular it 
captures the role of technological leadership. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA 
PATENT/SALES  Patent over sales of the parent firm. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA 
TELECOM  Dummy  variable,  1  if  the  parent  firm  belongs  to  the  TELECOM  sector,  0  otherwise.  We  call 
TELECOM the ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 32 sector, characterized by production of TV and radio 
equipments. According to ISTAT, this is the manufacturing sector with largest R&D investments in 
Italy. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of the level of technology of the parent firm.  
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
METAL  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the METAL sector, 0 otherwise. We call METAL the 
ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 28 sector, characterized by production of metal goods. 
Type: industry-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
PRECISION  Dummy  variable,  1  if  the  parent  firm  belongs  to  the  PRECISION  sector,  0  otherwise.  We  call 
PRECISION  the  ATECO  (NACE  REV  1.1)  33  sector,  characterized  by  production  of  precision 
instruments, watches and optical appliances. 
Type: industry-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
SALES  Sales of the parent company (billions Euro). 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: AIDA 
H_purpose  Dummy variable, 1 in case of horizontal purpose – i.e. the goods produced in Asia are addressed to the 
local market – 0 in case of vertical purpose – i.e. the goods produced in Asia are exported elsewhere. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
COUNTRIES 
Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm was engaged in international operations with more than 5 foreign 
countries before the FDI in Asia, 0 otherwise. It is a proxy for the firm’s experience in running foreign 
operations. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews   44 
SCALE  
Dummy variable, 1 if firm-level scale economies are important for the parent firm, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
NORTH-EAST 
Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm’s headquarter is located in the North-East of Italy, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews 
PRI 
Property Right Index: it scores the degree to which private property rights are protected and the degree 
to  which  the  government  enforces  laws  that  protect  private  property.  In  addition,  it  analyzes  the 
independence  of  the judiciary,  the  existence  of  corruption  within  the judiciary,  and  the  ability  of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges from 1 to 5, higher values associated with 
less protection. 
Type: country-level core regressor. 
Source: Miles et al. (2004) 
EFI 
Economic Freedom Index: it measures the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas - 
Size of Government, Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Sound Money, Freedom to 
Trade with Foreigners, and Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. It ranges from 0 to 10, higher 
values associated to more freedom. 
Type: country-level core regressor. 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2004) 
POP 
Population of the host country (millions of inhabitants). 
Type: country-level core regressor. 
Source: http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
TRADE 
Degree of openness of the host country, measured by (Import+Export)/GDP.  
Type: country-level core regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from 
http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
SEA 
Dummy  variable,  1  if  the  host  country  belongs  to  the  South  East  Asian  region,  i.e.  Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore, 0 otherwise. 






Table b2: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
PATENT  356  0.6086301  2.012699  0  14.96469 
TECH_relative  344  3.936645  10.88662  0  82.71236 
PATENT/SALES  356  0.1761435  0.7417115  0  7.073824 
SALES  356  0.262313  0.8978276  0.006  6.311476 
PRI  356  3.491573  0.7817905  1  5 
EFI  349  5.834098  0.7429829  5.3  8.6 
POP  356  9.279096  5.341437  0.435389  12.98848 





Table b3: Correlation matrix of the variables measuring Intangible Assets 
 
  GRADUATE  TRAINING  HIGHTECH  PATENT  TECH_relative  PATENT/SALES  TELECOM 
GRADUATE  1.0000             
TRAINING  0.0794  1.0000           
HIGHTECH  0.1090  0.1141  1.0000         
PATENT  0.2276  -0.0414  0.0252  1.0000       
TECH_relative  0.1875  -0.0090  -0.1426  0.4270  1.0000     
PATENT/SALES  0.1162  -0.0112  0.1724  0.6036  0.1054  1.0000   
TELECOM  0.1516  -0.0628  0.2133  -0.0420  -0.0664  -0.0019  1.0000 
 
 